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Introduction
Most U.S. citizens are born that way. But for immigrants, becoming a citizen is a slow
process. This process includes applying for a "green card," which gives an imrnigrant
the right to reside legally in the United States. A limited number of green cards are
available, and applicants must demonstrate that they qualify for a green card, most
commonly by showing a family relationship to a U.S. citizen or employment with a
U.S. company. Obtaining a green card can take many years, and once an irnmigrant
has obtained one, she must reside in the United States for several more years before
she can apply to become a naturalized citizen, which in turn requires a civics test,
an English language test, demonstration of good moral character, and an oath of
loyalty to the United States. Becorning a citizen is not a one-time event that occurs
when an irnrnigrant takes the loyalty oath, but a slow process of demonstrating value
to the nation and assimilation to its culture and values.
This chapter examines how this experience of becoming a citizen is affected by,
and in turn further entrenches, gender inequality. Although the law of immigration
and naturalization comports with principles of formal gender equality, the law,
especially the law of immigration, has gendered effects. Women are eligible to apply
for green cards based on a variety of qualifications, and their ability to qualify is
determined primary by the economic and cultural circumstances frorn which they
come. Most women are unable to meet the qualifications required for a green card
based on employment because they lack the skills deemed important by the United
States. Instead, the vast majority of women who apply to become permanent residents
do so based on relationships with U.S. citizen family members, usually husbands.
The result is that the pool of people available to seek naturalized citizenship includes
a disproportionate number of women who are eligible because of their marital
relationship and a disproportionate number of men who are eligible because of
their occupational skills.
Because rnarriage itself is a gender-producing institution, a system that creates
future citizens based on marital status has profound effects for the way in which
men and women experience becoming American. For both men and women who
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seek citizenship through marriage, it is heterosexual
marriage itself, and not the
loyalty oath or civics test, that provides the most important vehicle for assimilation.
Although marriage, and immigration
law's use of marriage, have changed dramatically over the past hundred years, immigration law still makes the assumption that
heterosexual rnarriages include a breadwinner,
with decision-making
authority over
issues such as residency, and a subordinate spouse (a "derivative spouse" in immigration law tenns), who is dependent financially
on the breaclwinning spouse. It
requires couples to demonstrate
their confonnity with these norms, even in cases
where the norms simply do not fit. And in cases where the norrns do fit, the requirement of confonnity further entrenches the notion that these norms represent what
is expected of American farnilies.
One of the legal mechanisms
for irnposing this dichotomous
and gendered view
of marriage is the discretion it gives a citizen to decide whether or not to spomor
his immigrant spouse for a green card. Because this broad discretion
is often abused
by spouses who are batterers,
Congress has created numerous exceptions
to the
nounal rules for immigrants who can prove they have been battered. 'The creation
of this class of future citizens further genders the pool of immigrants eligible for
naturalization:
many future U.S. citizens are eligible because they are battered
spouses; they must show victimhood to demonstrate
their worth as citizens. The
remainder of this chapter examines in more detail how imrnigration
law produces
future citizens
and the relationship
between th is process and the production of
gender.

Immigration as the Gatekeeper of Citizenship
Citizenship, like all status categories, serves a gatekeeping function. By demarcating
who is in and who is out, it defines the collective whole.' 'Those who are in are,
in the famous words of T, H. Marshall, given the "basic human equality associated
with . . full membership
of a cornmunitv">
Most citizens in the United States
today are citizens by birth: their experience of citizenship is essentially ascriptive. In
contrast, citizens who naturalize make a choice to be governed by the United States,
and the United States makes a choice to accept them as citizens. In the United States,
the criteria the government uses in making the decision to accept an irnrnigrant as
a naturalized citizen include a civics test, an English test, demonstration
of good
moral character, residency for a number of years, and an oath of loyalty to the
United States. Much has been written about what these criteria say about American
self-definition and the meaning of American citizensh ip.!
' See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenshi p and Nalionhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA Harvard
University Press, 1992), at 23-31.
T. 11. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Chapters (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press, 1950), at 8.
l See, e.g., Gerald Neuman, "Justifying U.S. Naturalization
Policies," 35 \la. J lnt'L L .. 237, 267 (199,1);
Peier J. Spiro, "Qucslioning
Barriers to Naturalization,"
13 Geo. Immigr. L. f. 479 (1999).
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But naturalization law does not tell the entire citizenship story. The naturalization oath takes only a minute to recite, but the demonstration
of worth required
to becorne a citizen begins the minute an irnrnigrant applies for legal residency.
Simone de Beauvoir farnously stated that "one is not born, rather, one becomes
a woman." Sirnilarly, immigrants who become naturalized citizens of the United
States obtain their citizenship
status not through an accident of birth, hut instead, by
repeatedly demonstrating their worth in ways that shape their identity and encourage assimilation
to American culture. For naturalizing citizens, the oath is a rite of
passage, the institution of a new relationship between individual and nation. But the
citizenship oath itself is merely the last in a lengthy series of acts that the immigrant
must undertake to demonstrate his or her value to the country.
To become a naturalized citizen, an immigrant must first become a lawful permanent resident (comruonly referred to as a "green-card holder"). Green cards are
not available to everyone one who wants one. Instead, U.S. immigration law sets out
specific categories of imrnigrants who can qualify for permanent residency, and even
those who qualify may sometimes have to wait many years before obtaining lawful
residency because most categories are subject to annual quotas. Eligible immigrants
include family members of U.S. citizens or permanent residents, immigrants who
are sponsored by a U.S. employer for a particular
job, political refugees, and socalled diversity immigrants frorn underrepresented countries who enter a lottery for
U.S. residency. Of these categories, family-based irnrnigrants receive by far the most
generous quotas and therefore dominate the number of immigrants who receive a
green card each year. For example, in 2007, over 1 million immigrants were granted
green cards, and of these, approximately 65 percent received them based on a family
relationship
to a U.S. citizen or resident, while around 15 percent went to irnrnigranl:s
sponsored by an employer and nearly 8 percent went to refugees or asylees fleeing
persecution in their home countries." Family relationships,
with a strong emphasis
on nuclear farnily relationships,
predominate in shaping the pool of people eligible
to obtain naturalized citizenship.
Once an irnrnigrant demonstrates that she fits within one of the prescribed categories, she must also demonstrate what she is not: a terrorist, an addict, a prostitute,
a polygamist, or a child abductor. Even people who otherwise satisfy the admissions
criteria will be excluded if they fall into any of these categories. So, too, will a
person with a criminal record, if the crime involved "moral turpitude" or if more
than one crirne was committed; anyone who enters illegally or with false documents
( even if the correct documents would demonstrate that the person fits one of the
admission
categories); or a person with a communicable disease. There are very
few ways around these exclusions; for most: of them, the only way to obtain discretionary relief is by demonstrating "extreme hardship" to a U.S. citizen or permanent

-I

"Yearbook of l mmigratiou Statistics: 2007," Table 6, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, available
at ht:tp://www.clhs.gov/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2008). The percentages do not total 100 because there are
other categories such as diversity immigrants.
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resident family rnernber.> Thus, these requirements function to lirnit further the pool
of potential citizens, once again by privileging those with family ties over others.
After an immigrant has obtained green card status, the clock begins ticking until
the elate when she is eligible to apply to become a naturalized citizen. A would-be
citizen must reside continuously within the United States for at least five years. In
aclclition, to naturalize, an immigrant must dernonstrate sufficient seriousness and
assimilation to American values, language, and culture by carrying on a conversation in English, passing a civics test, swearing allegiance
to the United States,
and demonstrating "good moral character."? But never again must the naturalizing
immigrant demonstrate that she qualifies for admission by virtue of a family tie,
employment, persecution, or luck. Those gatekeeping questions were already asked
and answered through the immigration process and now appear to be irrelevant for
purposes of naturalization.
The immigration restrictions, however, belie the idea
that citizenship is merely a question of loyalty and assimilation.
Only those immigrants who initially qualified for permanent residence will be qualified to apply
for citizenship.
Immigration
laws, even though they are not formally considered
to be rules of naturalization, thus regulate membership by acting as gatekeepers of
who can be admitted to the pool of eligible applicants for naturalized citizenship.
Accordingly,
immigration law performs much of the gatekeeping function usually
attributed to naturalization
in citizenship theory.
This function is easy to overlook, in part because the law has neatly divided citizenship and immigration into two separate areas, with citizenship law treated as
constitutional and important to national identity and immigration law as technical
and statutory. Citizenship is clearly constitutional: all persons born in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are, under the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. citizens, and the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
power to create a "uniform rule of naturalization."
But the power to regulate immigration is constitutional as well: although no particular clause grants Congress this
power, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the federal government enjoys
"plenary power" over irnmigration for a variety of reasons, including the country's
status as a sovereign nation entitled to protect its borders."
The law governing citizenship takes its cue from the naturalization
clause and
focuses on a uniform rule. But there is nothing in the Constitution requiring that
immigration
law be uniform, and, indeed, it is not. The United States frequently
makes distinctions between incoming immigrants based on national origin, marital
status, or educational background in the context of deciding who qualifies for a green
card and offers immigration officials significant discretion in determining whom to
admit. The law of immigration focuses not on uniformity, but on diversity: how to

7

See 8 U .SC. SS 1182 (a), (g), (i) (2008).
8 U .S.C. SS 14-27 (a)-(b) (2006)
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV; U.S. Constitution, Article I, S 8, cl. 4; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977) (articulating plenary power doctrine); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (same).
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choose from a variety of possible future citizens the ones who will become eligible
to qualify under the uniform rule.
Citizenship, as this book demonstrates,
has rnany meanings. It can refer to the
possession of political, civil, and social rights; active engagernent in the life of the
political comrnunity; and ties of identification and solidarity. Many people who are
not technically citizens enjoy some of these features of what we call "citizenship":
they may, for example, be actively engaged in their comrnunities, feel solidarity with
the United States, and intend to live here perrnanently (a green card holder is, after
all, a "permanent resident"). But becoming a naturalized citizen gives an immigrant
full political rights, including the right to remain in the country even if she commits
a crime, the right to return if she leaves the country's borders, and the right to vote
in federal elections. Citizenship status is durable: it cannot be taken away unless the
citizen expresses a clear intent to expatriate herself, and under rnany circumstances,
U.S. citizens can transmit their American citizenship to their children even if their
children are born abroad, thus creating a new generation of American citizens. A
green card holder is a permanent resident, but only a partial member; it is only upon
naturalization
that an immigrant becomes a full-fledged member of the political
community.
Understanding how immigrants become citizens, then, requires an understanding
of the entire process ofbecorning, not just the moment of naturalization.
It is through
the entire naturalization
process that the United States most clearly articulates what
it requires of its citizens. Unlike citizens by birth, naturalized citizens are in a
position to consent as adults to be governed and to take part in the governing that
democracy entails. The questions the country asks of naturalizing citizens and how
naturalizing
citizens experience their becoming American are therefore crucial to
understanding what American citizenship means,
Neither the uniform rule of naturalization
nor the law of irnmigration appears to
be gendered.
Nowhere does the Immigration and Nationality Act distinguish, for
example, between husbands and wives of U.S. citizens, between brothers and sisters,
or between male employees of U.S. companies and female employees. Yet immigration law is profoundly gendered in the way that it shapes the pool of immigrants
available to become naturalized citizens because it uses the family as a preselection
device in deciding which immigrants are worthy of gaining legal resident status
and because it privileges some employment skills over others.8 Given the gendered
8

In this chapter, l focus solely on the process of becoming a naturalized citizen. There are certainly
things to say about the gendered aspects of citizenship by birth. Many commentators have pointed out
the highly gendered nature of the [u» sanguinis (citizenship by blood) doctrine, as shown in Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (zooi ), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute that gives automatic
citizenship to children born abroad to female U.S. citizens but requires children born abroad to male
U.S. citizens to demonstrate their fathers' intent to parent, through either rnarriage to the mother or
other acts demonstrating intent to claim paternity before the child turns eighteen. Although it: is true
that this case shows a stark disparity in how the law conceives of male and female citizens and their
ability to transmit citizenship to their children based on biological and social gender roles, as Rogers
Smith argues in Chapter 1 of this volume, the number of people affected by the Nguyen holding
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family systerns and ernployrneut markets that exist in immigrants home countries,
it should be no surprise that their ability to obtain legal residency is also influenced
by gender.

Becoming a Citizen Through Employment
One path to citizenship

for immigrants is employment-based
permanent residency.
preference categories, an i mmigrant must have a job offer from an American company that has clernonst:rated its
inability to find an American worker to do the job. The employee is, at least theoretically, filling a gap in the American work force and contributing to the efficiency
of the U.S. economy. The most preferred category goes lo "priority workers," which
include aliens with "extraordinary ability" who have obtained "sustained national
or international
acclaim" for their work; "outstanding professors or researchers;"
and "multinational executives and managers." The second category includes "professionals holding advanced degrees" and immigrants with "exceptional
ability in
arts, sciences, or business." T'he third category includes "skilled workers in short
supply," "professionals with baccalaureate degrees," and "unskilled workers." Each
of the first three categories has an annual quota of 40,000 workers, but the third
category has a special subquota for so-called unskilled workers of just 10,000. There
is also a fourth category for "special imrnigrants," which include clergy and former
government employees, with a quota of 10,000, and a fifth category for "investors"
who plan to hire Americans and invest at least $1 million in a business venture."
Together, these categories work to generate a large pool of highly skilled workers
and keep the number of unskilled workers low.

To obtain a green card under most employment

As one might suspect frorn exarnining the employment-based
immigration
options, most people who enter the United States to work cannot achieve permanent
residency. They either use temporary work visas that expire after a certain amount
of time, or they enter illegally. Ernployrnent-based
bermaneni residence visas (those
that confer a green card) are limited by Congress to a rnaximum of 140,000 per year.
The supply of these visas is far less than the demand, whether demand is measured
by the immigrants who would like permanent residence and work in the United
States or by the employers who would like to hire them. The government limits the
number of employment visas because of the broad rights they confer. As a green
card holder, an irnrnigrant can quit her job and take another, or not work at all;
she is not a temporary worker or guest, but a potentially permanent part of the work
force, with the personal autonomy that a U.S. citizen worker would have. In five
years, she will be eligible to naturalize even if she quit her job immediately after
is relatively small. l deal here with an issue that affects more people and has greater consequences
for the expressive power of law: the requirements
that citizenship
law and immigration
law place
immigrants
who desire to naturalize and the gendered consequences
of these requirements.
9 8 o.s.c.
1153 (b) (2006).
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arrival. Cranting an irnrnigrant pennanent resident status based on a particular job
offered by a particular employer is a risk for the country, and it is a risk the country is
wiJling to take only in cases where the immigrant has skills that are relatively scarce
and likely to produce employment regardless of the solvency or status of a particular
employer. The result is that the majority of slots for employment-based
irnrnigration
go to i111migrants with high levels of education or practice-based skills.
It should be no surprise that cl system that values education and skills that require
sustained
employment
would lead to unequal outcomes for men and women.
Throughout much of the world, women are less likely than men to have received an
education or have work experience and are more likely to be involved in care work
for their families that wiJI interrupt or slow clown a career. This reality is reflected
in statistics on permanent residency. On the surface, employment visas appear to be
allocated in a gender-neutral
manner: in 2004, for example, 75,025 went to women
and 80,289 went to men.'? But a closer look at these statistics reveals that women
are gaining irnmigranl: status not as employees, but as family members. A green card
based on employment categories carries with it the privilege of bestowing "derivative
status" on the employee's dependents. That means that an employee who gains residency under, say, the multinational
executive category can also obtain green cards
for his spouse and children. They, in turn, wiJI be considered
employrnent-basecl
immigrants,
and they wiJI count toward the annual total of em.ployment visas. So
to determine whether the men and women who receive employment-based
green
cards are really corning here as employees or as family members of employees, we
must look to statistics on whether they are primary or derivative beneficiaries
of the
employment visa category. Again using the numbers for 2004, of the 75,025 women
who received employment-based
green cards, only 20,125 did so as the primary beneficiary; the other 54,900 were wives or children ( derivatives) of primary beneficiaries.
Of the 80,289 men who received employment-based
green cards, 52,417 were the prirnary beneficiaries,
and 27,872 were derivative beneficiaries."
Men overwhelrningly
predominate as primary beneficiaries
in employment-based
irrnnigration.
There certainly are some women who manage to obtain green cards through their
own employrnent ~ in 2004, these women represented 3.9 percent of the women who
obtained green cards. But the vast majority of women cannot immigrate this way.
The economic experience of women in sending countries illustrates why. Imagine,
for example, a very common example: an immigrant woman who would like to
apply for green card status based on her ability to be a nanny. The employment
categories are designed to attract immigrants in high-demand fields that are unlikely
to be saturated by American workers. The Department of Labor (DOL) lists "child
10
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l chose to use the numbers from 2004 because they were the most recent statistics I could find. See
"Women lnnnigranls
and Family l.rnmigration,"
Legal Momentum, available at http://www.nilc.org/
(accessed Oct. 29, 2008) (citing Kelly Jeffreys, Characteristics
of Familv-Soonsored Legal Permanent
Residents: 2004 (Washington,
DC: Office of Immigration
Statistics,
Department of Homeland Security, 2005).
Ibid.
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care worker" as an in-demand field,12 and yet, our prospective immigrant would have
a very difficult time finding work as a nanny in the United States
at least legally.
First, she would have to apply for a green card. To do this, she would have to find
an employer to sponsor her. It is unlikely, given the nature of the job, that many
employers would be willing to make a commitment to sponsor a nanny without at
least meeting the person who will care for their children for an interview, but this is
impossible if the immigrant is living abroad.
Even if she can find an employer to sponsor her, a child care worker will have a
long wait for a green card. She is not a first-preference person of extraordinary ability,
outstanding professor or researcher, or multinational
executive, nor is she a secondpreference professional holding an advanced degree or person of exceptional ability
in the arts, science, or business. Immigrants entering under these categories can be at
work in the United States within several months of applying because there is a large
enough supply of slots (40,000 for each preference annually) to meet the demand.
The only conceivable category our hypothetical
child care worker will qualify for is
the third preference for skilled and unskilled workers. This category has 40,000 spots
per year but limits unskilled workers to only 10,000 slots, and the child care worker
is likely to be considered
unskilled. This is partly the result of the way the United
States construes the terms skilled and unskilled. Immigration law defines skilled labor
as work that requires at least two years of training or postsecondary education.
The
DOL, in turn, makes findings about specific occupations and how much training
is needed for each. Because the DOL characterizes
child care as needing "very
little" experience, it generally counts as unskilled labor for immigration purposes. '3
Because the number of unskilled workers who would like to immigrate to the United
States far exceeds the 10,000 slots available, there is a long waiting list for this category.
In October 2008, for example, the Citizenship and Imrnigration Bureau was finally
processing green card applications for unskilled workers who applied for their green
cards on January 1, 2003.14 By the time our hypothetical
nanny gets her green card,
the infant she is to care for will be in kindergarten.
>-

The classification
of child care work as unskilled rests on certain assumptions
about how skills are acquired. The child care worker's skill set was not acquired
during an apprenticeship
or graduate school, but instead during a lifetime of caring for other family members, gender socialization,
and prioritizing family tasks
over more individualistic
pursuits. Child care is a job that many men would be
unqualified for precisely because they have not received the same training and
acculturation that many women have received - because they lack certain skills.
The DOL's classification of this work as unskilled means that for the millions of
12

13

14

"Summary Report for Child Care Workers," O*net, available at http://online.onetcenter.org/
(accessed
Feb. 23, 2009) (listing "child care worker" as an in-demand field).
Ibid. (listing "child care worker" as an occupation for which "some previous work-related skill, knowledge, or experience may be helpful . . but usually is not needed" and for which "employees need
anywhere from a few months to a year of working with experienced employees").
See "Visa Bulletin for October 2008," available at http://travel.sl:ate.gov/
(accessed Oct. 29, 2008).
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wornen who count extensive child care experience as their primary employment
credential, legal employment-based
irnrnigration is not an option, nor is citizenship
flowing from legal employment-based
irnmigration. Such a woman, unlike the cornputer programmer, biology professor, clergyrnan,
or physical therapist, cannot say,
"I acquired citizenship
in part because I had an important skill that was in short
supply in the United States." Her most likely option for obtaining citizenship
is to do
so by rnarrying a U.S. citizen or as a derivative spouse of a male ernployment-based
i In rn igran t.

Becoming a Citizen Through Marriage
Why Marriage?
In employment-based
immigration,
the theory behind the preferences
is easy to
deduce. Congress has allocated the largest numbers of slots to imrnigrants
who have
skills or experience that will be useful to the American economy, without displacing
native workers. Family-based imrnigration is more complicated. It is not self-evident
why spouses of U.S. citizens would be more likely than other irnmigrants to add
value to the nation, both as permanent residents and, eventually, as naturalized
citizens.
Surely from the perspective of immigration
law, the reason to privilege marriage
is largely one of administrative convenience;
rnarriage provides a clear-cut category
for deterrnining
whether a romantic relationship
is significant enough to trigger
permanent resident status for an irnrnigrant. Inquiring into the details of individual
relationships to determine whether a relationship is substantial and permanent would
be unwieldy and potentially invasive. As in other areas oflaw, by allowing the state to
cut through potentially enormous amounts of red tape, rnarriage does the work. But
adrnin istrative convenience does not tell the whole story. The United States provides
much broader family-based imrnigration
than most Western receiving countries;
there is nothing about marriage that necessarily gives an immigrant the right to
relocate or change her citizenship. So why would the United States rely on marriage
to do so much work in creating the pool of future citizens?
There are several ways of thinking about why marriage, immigration status, and
citizenship might, as a normative matter, be so closely tied. First, marriage is a useful
way to determine whether someone is already a partial member of a community. By
demonstrating a marital relationship, a prospective immigrant or citizen is in one
sense already demonstrating that she is worthy of rnernbership
in the society. She is
essentially saying, "I am a member because I have close ties to a member," or even, "I
am a member because a member has chosen me." Marriage makes the membership.
A strong version of this theory of citizenship was evidenced in the Citizenship
Act of
1855, which made any woman who married a male U.S. citizen automatically a U.S.
citizen herself, and the Expatriation
Act of 1907, which automatically divested any
female U.S. citizen of her citizenship
if she married a foreigner. Under this theory,
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;1 woruan could not be loyal to a nation
and a husband of a different nationality.
The act of attaining or renouncing
citizenship was simultaneous
with the act of
rnarri;ige. There was no process of "becoming a citizen;" it simply happen eel when
marriage happened. Today, wornen are no longer treated differently than men as an
official matter, and marriage and citizenship are not statuses that immigrants enter
into simultaneously.
But the privileging of marriage relationships
in citizenship still
represents a weak form of the view that the fact of marriage gives us evidence that
some cultural assimilation has already occurred.
Second, we rn ight think of the treatment of marriage as a prediction of assirnilation
and value.A person who marries a U.S. citizen rnight be perceived as more likely to
become a stable, productive citizen. This rnight be because the U.S. citizen is more
likely to be already embedded
within American culture, in terms of friendships,
employment contacts, linguistic competence,
and cultural literacy. It also might be
because a married couple is more likely to achieve financial
stability, and this will
reduce the immigrant's likelihood
of becoming a public charge. In this view, the
family functions as a crucible for assimilation. What exactly are the American values
we expect to be inculcated through the marital relationship? These values depend in
part on the kind of marriage being practiced, which may explain why irnrnigration
law does not recognize, for example, polygamous
marriages.
Immigration
law's
preferences for spousal immigration could rely on a strong presumption that the
citizen spouse will exert a stronger pull, possibly because she will be constantly
supported by the surrounding culture, than the immigrant spouse, thus working to
acculturate the noncitizen. But in some communities, especially where the citizen
spouse is a recent immigrant himself, this may not be the case at all. The more
recent irnrnigrant spouse could perform the role of preventing the citizen spouse
from becoming too American by acting as a reminder of the cultural norms of the
home country and thwarting assimilation.
Tlurd, rnarriage and citizenship may be linked because we care about the rights
of U.S. citizens to exercise their own citizenship
through transmitting
it to others.
Citizens exercise citizenship
in many ways - by voting, by participation
in public
and civic life, by service on juries, and by service in the military (although rnany
of these exercises of citizenship are or have been available to noricitizens as well).
One way in which citizens can exercise their citizenship
is by transrnitting it to
someone else - to a child or to a spouse. Although courts have been reluctant to
explicitly grant rights to immigrants based on the interests of their citizen relatives,
sympathy for the plight of U.S. citizens stranded without their loved ones pervades
the irnrnigration statutes. Not only do the admissions
categories favor family immigrants, but the waivers to exclusions based on the immigrant's health, criminal
background, or fraudulent activity all focus on the question of whether excluding
the immigrant will cause hardship to the U.S. citizen or permanent resident, not the
immigrant. Although there is 110 constitutional right to family unity in this regime,
Americans who seek to reunite with their foreign family members are given statutory
assistance.
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Marriage, then, is linked to imrnigration and citizenship status in import.mt ways,
ancl for a variety of reasons. Some oi tliese reasons rnay include the idea that marriage
tells us something, both retrospectively and prospectively, about the likelihood that
an irnrnigrant will assimilate successfully, and the idea that marriage is a valuable
enough activity for citizens that we should facilitate their ability to marry, even if
their choice of mate is not an Arneiican. But marriage also requires the parties to
the marriage to take on certain burdens, including a duty of support and a duty
of services to the other. Requiring couples to be married does not simply take the
temperature of the relationship
to determine the legitirnacy of the bond. It also
measures how willing a couple is to enter into an institution with a lot of rnoral and
political baggage and to take on obligations of financial support to each other. And
because marriage operates as a near prerequisite to citizenship for many women, it
is worth thinking about how marriage shapes women's identity and what the costs of
relying on it to create a pool of citizens might be.

How Immigration Law Shapes Marriage
A first-order issue is the conditions under which wornen rnarry in their countries
of origin. Despite clivorce reforms, including the move to a no-fault divorce system
that took place in t:he United Stales and many Western democracies in the 1970s,
many countries still retain divorce laws in which it is difficult or impossible for a
wornan to extricate herself frorn a bad marriage. In many countries, the average
age of marriage for women is very young, and because wornen have scarce opportunities to enter into professions or trades that would make them self-supporting,
marriage is t:he only econornically viable option, even if the terms of marriage are not
opti mal.
Once they arrive in t:he United States, irnn1igration law encourages irrnnigrants to
shape their marriages in ways that confonn to an American model of marriage. To
demonstrate that a newly entered marriage is not fraudulent, immigrants (and their
citizen spouses) must provide evidence of the legitimacy of their marriages. Th is
evidence usually goes far beyond documentation
that the marriage occurred; the regulations, for example, list the following as factors l:o be considered: (1) documentation
showing joint ownership of property; (2) a lease showing joint tenancy of a common
residence; (3) documentation showing commingling of financial resources; (4) birth
certificates of children horn to the marriage; (5) affidavits of third parties having
knowledge of the bona fides of the marital relationship;
or (6) other documentation establishing that the marriage was not entered into to evade the immigration
laws of the United States." In other words, the immigrant is encouraged, although
not required,
to shape her identity in ways that will make her marriage look bona
fide, and these ways basically boil clown to cohabitation,
commingling
of funds,
and children, regardless of what marriage means to her and her spouse. It is the
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interdependency
of marriage, and its sexual and reproductive aspects, that are seen
as indicia of genuineness. Although the regulations do not say it, it is highly un I ikely
that a married couple who admitted they had no romantic or sexual relationship
would qualify as bona fide for innnigration
purposes. Participation
in heterosexual
marriage, and a very particular kind at that, is the prerequisite
for permanent
resident status based on a personal relationship.
This requirement
can shape marriages
in various directions.
Some couples rnay make their marriages more traditional in
an effort to demonstrate
their bona fides. But for some couples, the requirements
1nay force them to make their marriages more egalitarian. A joint bank account, for
example, might be a step back frorn separate bank accounts but an improvement
from one bank account, accessible only by the husband.
The act of becoming a citizen through heterosexual
rnarriage carries with it the
corollary that one cannot become a citizen through other relationships.
Under the
Defense of Marriage Act, a "spouse" is defined as an opposite-sex marital partner,
and "rnarriage" is defined as a union between a man and a wornan. Therefore, every
time an immigration
law provision refers to "spouse" or "marriage,"
it means only
opposite-sex spouses and marriages, regardless of whether a couple has been legally
married under the law of another country.l"
Much has been written on the effect that this exclusion has on gay and lesbian
couples seeking irnrnigration status.17 In many cases, it means that couples are unable
to live together because there is no alternative immigration category available.
Sorne
couples have resorted to marriage fraud ( in which the immigrant spouse marries a
U.S. citizen of the opposite sex) to live in the same place. The nonrecognition
of same-sex relationships
may affect the development
of these relationships.
In
nascent relationships
in which two people know they have little chance of being
able eventually to live together, investing in a long-term relationship may simply
seem out of the question.
Denying gay and lesbian citizens the opportunity
to
sponsor a spouse puts them in a different relationship
to the state than other citizens.
Their citizenship rights are reduced; this particular aspect of their citizenship can be
exercised only by entering into a marriage that feels like a sham. Because marriage is
the institution thatassirnilates
the noncitizen spouse to American values and culture,
the law's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages implies that there is sornething unAmerican about these marriages. Assuming that the noncitizen spouse plans to reside
in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage or domestic partnerships, which seems
fairly likely, it is unclear what makes him or her so different from the American
citizens already living there. (If anything, a person who immigrates to the United
States might be doing so because a gay or lesbian identity is more accepted in
American culture than in her country of origin.)

16
7

1

1 U.S.C. S 7 (2000).
In addition, much has been written about the history of the categorical exclusion of gays and lesbians
as immigrants,
regardless of their relationship
status. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. and Nan D.
Hunter, eek, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), at 1360-67.
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In addition to encouraging irnrnigrants to shape their marriages into a particular
brand of heterosexual
union to avoid the appearance of fraud, immigration law also
shapes irnrnigrant marriages in other ways. The first of these is the somewhat curious
practice of requiring the citizen or legal resident spouse to "sponsor" the immigrant
spouse for imrnigration status, rather than simply having the imrnigrant apply herself.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an immigrant who wants to use his or
her status as a spouse of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident does not automatically
become eligible to file for a green card. Instead, the immigrant's citizen spouse must
sponsor her for green card status. In other words, a citizen can prevent his spouse,
whether intentionally or negligently, frorn obtaining legal status simply by failing to
file the appropriate paperwork, and there is nothing the immigrant spouse can do
about it.
In the context of current family law, the spousal sponsorship
requirement
looks
quite unusual. Marriage in farnily law is a hybrid institution that is part status and
part contract, and there are some core status concepts that exist to prevent one
spouse from taking unfair advantage of the other. For example, many states have
elective share laws that ensure that a surviving spouse will receive a fair portion
of a deceased spouse's estate, even if the deceased spouse explicitly disinherited
the surviving spouse in her will. Furthermore, courts frequently refuse to enforce
contracts between married couples if the contract: would work a financial injustice
on one party, and they certainly do not allow one spouse to dictate to the other
whether to work outside the borne, where to live, or whether to travel. In one sense,
the whole point of marriage is to access a set of benefits and burdens: each spouse
gains rights vis-a-vis the other, and those rights create reciprocal burdens=- the right
to be supported also means a duty to support.
Immigration law turns the idea of marriage as a committed status into an institution
into which a citizen spouse can selectively opt in or out. If citizen spouses want their
immigrant spouses to come to the United States to live with them, they can choose
to sponsor them, but if they would rather keep them at a distance, they have the
option of refusing to do so. lmrnigration law essentially gives the reins to the citizen
spouse to decide what his or her marriage means, regardless of the wishes of the
immigrant spouse.
Although the spousal sponsorship requirement strikes an odd chord in the context
of rnarriage law today, when it was first instituted, it made much more sense. At
common law, a woman's citizenship
followed her husband's, and husbands, as
heads of household,
had decision-making
control over many aspects of their wives'
lives, including whether to administer chastisement,
how to manage the wife's
property, and where the couple would live. Although domestic relations law had
changed considerably
by the 1920s, when the first numerical quotas were placed
on immigration,
the idea of the husband as head of household was still reflected
in the laws. Unlike today's immigration law, which defines an "immediate relative"
as the spouse or child of a citizen, the 1921 Immigration Act defined an imrnediate
relative as the wife of a male citizen. Husbands offemale citizens were not eligible to
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irnrnigrate based on their marriages; in fact, their citizen wives lost U.S. citizeuship
cl foreigner.'8
Control over a wife's irnmigration
status was seen as part
and parcel of a husband's right to control his household;
wives dicl not share the
same right. When a visa requirement
was added in 1924, it made sense that a wife
ch1irning to be entitled to a visa by virtue of her rnarriage to a U.S. citizen husband
would need, in essence, to seek her husband's permission
to do so by asking hirn to
file a petition on her behalt.!? The male head of household
was the decision maker
regarding the domicile not only of his children, but of his wife."?
This formal discrimination between husbands and wives was eliminated in 1952,
when Congress changed the word "wife" to "spouse" and gave both male and fernak
citizen spouses control over their immigrant spouses' immigration status." But making the statute gender-neutral
has not resulted in substantive equality. Because a
majority of immigrants who use their status as the spouse of a U.S. citizen to obtain
legal irnrnigration status are female, the law disproportionately
affects immigrant
women. 'The law continues to grant astonishing power to the citizen spouse. People
often do things their spouses do not like - they spend too much of the couple's
joint income; they work outside the home (or do not); they have different standards
of cleanliness ' or television watchinz b' or parenting b - but the law does not: usually
interfere to give one spouse power over t:he other's decision-making
process. In marriages in which wives already experience subordination,
the additional
power to the
husband conferred by immigration
law can exacerbate these power dynamics.
Contemporary irnrnigration law's retention of the spousal sponsorship
requirerneut may once again rest on concerns about administrative convenience:
this is the
way thi11gs had been clone before, and the spousal sponsorship requirement neatly
matches the requirement
that an employer sponsor an imrnigra11t in the employment categories. There may also be concerns about fraud: what if the immigrant
spouse is lying about the marital relationship?
Although this should be easy to detect
through documentation,
requiring the citizen spouse (who, in theory, might have
less of an interest than the immigrant in the immigrant's permanent residency if
the marriage were a sham) to sponsor the immigrant
might reduce the number of
fraud cases. Convenience
aside, however, the spousal sponsorship requirement
has
serious consequences for immigrant spouses. As an expressive matter, the citizen
spouse stands in for the nation. The immigrant spouse's reason for obtaining legal
permanent residency (and, ultimately,
citizenship) is her tie to t:he citizen spome. J\
marriage on paper may not be enough to ensure that the tie is significant enough to
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Act of May 29, ,921, Prrb. I,. 5, S2(a), 42 Stat. 5; [•'.xp,1lriat:ion Act, ch. 2534, ~ 3, 3'1 Stat. 1228, 1228-29
(H)07).
'9 Act of May 26, H)24, ch. 190, S 7(b), 43 St,11. 153, 156 (1952).
'0
Indeed, ,1 wife's domicile was presumed lo Follow 11,at· of her husband for jurisdictional
purposes well
into the twentieth century. Sec Mas v. Perry, 489 l<".2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974) (overtnrning a lower court
decision that· a U.S. citizen wife's domicile followed that of her foreign husband).
" An Act to Revise the Laws ReLtt:ing to Immigration,
Naturalization,
and Nationality;
and for Other
Purposes, Pub f ,. 82--414, 66 Stat. 163, 178 (1952).
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warrant lawful perrnanent resident status; the ernergence of no-fault divorce rneans
that marriage as a legal status has ceased to have permanence.
The nation relies
on the citizen spouse to make this judgment call, based on his feelings about the
immigrant spouse. Is the couple really in it for the long haul? If so, then the nation
is, too.
The spousal sponsorship requirement
also has the potential to alter the dynamics
of a rnarriage in unintended ways. It gives the citizen spouse power that one spouse
does not normally have over the other, at least not in the United States. Indeed, the
spousal spm isorsh i p re qui rem en twas a major ca use of the passage of the i m rn igration
portions of the Violence Against Women Act (VA 'vVA), which create exceptions to the
spousal sponsorship rules for battered spouses. Because citizen spouses sometimes
use the threat of nonsponsorship
to keep an immigrant spouse in an otherwise
abusive relationship,
VA 'vVA created exceptions for imrnigrant spouses who could
prove they were battered. But the necessity of VA 'vVA should make us wonder about
the sponsorship requirement
altogether: why should one member of a married
couple be allowed to dictate what marriage means for immigration and, ultimately,
citizenship? The act of sponsorship becomes a syrnbolic act of charily, altruism, and
sacrifice on the part of the citizen spouse, in part because it is not required. The
irnmigrant spouse comes to the United States already indebted to the citizen spouse:
she eventually becomes eligible for naturalization
because of the good graces of
an American who was kind enough to sponsor her. For the citizen spouse, the act
of sponsorship
is an exercise of citizenship: through sponsorship, he transrnits his
citizenship to another, and th is act is independent of the decision to marry. Control
goes to the citizen spouse in part because of the notion that citizen spouses have
rights to be with their families if they want to be. It is a right not of rnarriage, but of
citizenship.
Irnrnigration law not only puts the immigrant spouse in a subordinated position,
but it also forces the sponsoring, citizen spouse into a breadwinning
position. In
addition to sponsoring his immigrant spouse, the citizen spouse rnust also sign an
affidavit of support that demonstrates that he can support the immigrant at an annual
income that is not less than 125 percent of the federal poverty line. This number
is calculated by adding the immigrant (and any relatives immigrating with her)
to the number of people already in the sponsor's household and looking up the
federally published salary necessary for that year. The immigrant spouse's ability to
earn an income herself will be deemed irrelevant in the calculation. The obligation of support is potentially permanent;
it ends only if the sponsored immigrant
becomes a naturalized citizen; she works for approximately
ten years ( or, in the
case of a married immigrant,
her spouse works for ten years while they are married); she relinquishes permanent resident status and leaves the country; or she dies.
None of these exigencies is completely within the control of the citizen sponsor. If
the irnrnigrant spouse chooses not to apply for citizenship or refuses or cannot work,
she can sue her citizen sponsor for support under the affidavit of support, even if
they have divorced. The affidavit of support requirement forces the citizen spouse
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into a breaclwinning role regardless of the actual dynamics of the relationship,
and
has the potential to do so even once the rnarriage is over.22
Together, the requirement
that rnarriage be heterosexual,
the grant of control to
the citizen spouse over the immigrant spouse's immigration status, the requirernent
that the citizen spouse demonstrate that he can function as a breadwinner, and the
strong incentives couples are given to conform to particular ideals of cohabitation,
commingling of funds, and children add up to a vision of a particular kind of
heterosexual
marriage in which one family member subordinates her autonomy
and identity to her spouse. Of course, the law is completely gender-neutral. There
is 110 requirement that the citizen spouse be a man, or that the imrnigrant spouse
be a woman, A woman citizen will have to demonstrate breadwinning
capabilities
and will have decision-making authority over whether her husband can apply for a
green card. But given the gendered dynamics that already exist in many marriages,
and given that the majority of marriage-based immigration involves citizen husbands
sponsoring immigrant wives, the imp! ications of the law for many citizen-immigrant
rnarriages are troubling. By dernanding
that immigrants fit a traditional model of
marital gender roles, the law may be perpetuating and exacerbating these roles in
ways that are harmful to women.

Naturalization
Immigration law, then, shapes the pool of potential naturalized citizens and puts
them through a crucible of training to become Arnericans by their participation in
heterosexual marriage. But once a green card is acquired, this process goes on. The
default rule for citizenship is that the applicant must undergo a five-year residency
period after obtaining a green card. But for spouses of citizens, regardless of the
irnrnigrant category used for green card purposes, th is period is reduced to three
years if they are "living in marital union." Unlike in the context of imrnigration law,
there is no administrative
convenience purpose for this rule. There, the law is trying
in part to ascertain whether a relationship really counts as a family relationship,
but here, all green card holders are eligible to naturalize if they meet the residency
requirements, take the oath, pass the tests, and are of "good moral character." In the
case of the reduced number of years for citizenship,
we see a rnore concentrated
example of what we saw in the immigration context: marriage to a citizen is a proxy for
8 U.S.C.
S u83a (2002); 8 C.F.ll. S 213a.2(e) (2007); Form l-864P. T'he sponsor's
oblig;ition
to support
the immigrant
also
terminates
if the sponsor
dies.
8 C.F.R.
§ 213'1-2 (e)(ii) (2007); see also Cheshire v. Cheshire, 3:05-cv-00453-TJC-MCR,
2006 WL 1208010,
at "In 8 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2006) (holding that the husband in divorce action is liable for payments
based on affidavit of support, tliat it is immaterial whether the defendant can afford the judgment,
and that the wife is not required lo work). The sponsor's obligation
to support the imuugrant
also
terminates if the sponsor dies. 8 C.!i.R. S 213a.2 (c)(ii) (2007). However, if the deceased sponsor foiled
to snpport· H,e immigrant while alive, the im,nigr:rnt may sue the deccased's estate. 8 C.F.R. § 213 a.z
(e)(2) (1-erminalion
does not relieve the sponsor's estate from any reimbursement
obligation
tk1t
accrucr] before termination).
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assimilation, both prospectively and retrospectively,
and the reduced waiting period
can also be construed as a privilege of citizenship enjoyed by the citizen spouse. Once
again, engagement in heterosexual marriage is thought to shape immigrants in a way
that makes them more likely to be true "Americans"
by the time they naturalize. Also,
once again, sarne-sex marriages do not qualify. From the government's perspective,
perhaps a married legal resident is less risky than a single resident or someone
married to a foreigner. The government is willing to make the jump from granting
legal residency (which can be revoked if the irnmigrant commits a crime, or spends
too much tirne living abroad, or demonstrates
bad moral character) to granting
citizenship ( which is permanent) at an earlier date than it would for someone else.
Marriage tames the irnmigrant into a citizen.

Becoming a Citizen by Becoming a Victim
By privileging family immigration and granting citizens the power to withhold sponsorship from their irnrnigrant spouses, U.S. immigration law has created a need for
a patchwork of exceptions to the normal rules of imrnigration admissions. Whereas
normally, an immigrant must demonstrate family ties, employment opportunities,
or refugee status or win the diversity lottery to gain legal admission, the law makes
exceptions for battered spouses and children. It does so in part because of the perverse
effect of the spousal sponsorship requirement: some spouses withhold or threaten to
withhold sponsorship to keep their spouses in an abusive relationship. The law provides a self-petitioning
option for immigrants who demonstrate that they have been
battered or subjected to "extreme cruelty" by their citizen or permanent resident
spouses. In these cases, because of the immigrant's status as a battered spouse, the
citizen spouse loses control over the immigration process.23
In addition to qualifying for exceptions to the general immigration rules, battered
spouses are also eligible for exceptions to the general naturalization
rules. Battered
spouses are entitled to naturalize in three years, just as if they were married to a U.S.
citizen, even if they have divorced the citizen. If a person obtained lawful permanent
resident status "by reason of his or her status as a spouse or child of a United States
citizen who battered him or her or subjected him or her to extrerne cruelty," then
the person is still entitled to the three-year, instead of the normal five-year, waiting
period.r+
All of these provisions became law as part of the VA WA of 1994 and subsequent
VA WA amendments. As the title of the act suggests, Congress was concerned about
the plight of battered women, not battered men, when it passed VAWA. The immigration provisions, like most irnrnigration provisions today, are gender-neutral
on
their face. But they are designed to treat a problem that Congress believed affected
mostly women, and indeed, women are far more likely to bring VAWA claims than
'l
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men and to have those claims taken seriously when they do. The law thus affects
men and women very differently, both in terms of who is likely to take advantage of
it and in terms of how it shapes the identities of those who do.
Tl re VA'vVA exceptions provide a challenge
to the usual idea that citizenship
involves a consenting relationship between citizen and state. In the case of a battered
spouse, the reason for her relationship
with the state - both in the initial inquiry
concerning her green card status and later, during the naturalization
process - is
her battering. She thus consents to a relationship with a nation because of her
involvernent in a relationship
that violated her consent. We rnight even think that
she is not in a position to consent because she is fleeing a relationship of coercion.
These exceptions also twist the usual way in which marriage is used as a shortcut
to citizenship
status. In the usual case, the law presumes that marriage helps to
assimilate the irnmigrant; through the relationship
with the citizen spouse, the
immigrant becomes more likely to be a productive citizen. In the battering cases,
the state steps in to replace the battering spouse. The new citizen's treatrnent by
her spouse in a private space becomes the basis for her public relationship
with
the nation. But instead of the private relationship
standing in for the project of
assimilation,
public belonging is now the result of the deviance and corruption of
the private relationship;
the prospective citizen's relationship with the nation is a
substitute for her relationship with a husband/protector
who has gone wrong. The
nation rnust step in as her protector.
From the government's perspective, a green card given because of an immigrant's
victim status looks very different frorn one given based on an irnmigrant's employmerit potential or farnily connections.
In the latter cases, the decision
to make
residency legal - and ultimately, to open the possibility of citizenship - appears to
be based on a calculation that the immigrant is likely to be of value to the country,
either became of the skills she brings as a worker or the stability she offers as a
family member of a citizen or resident. As we have seen, in the case of the family
preferences, there is also a sense that she is more assimilable because of her family
relationship.
In the case of the battered imrnigrant, it is unclear what exactly the
nation gains by giving the immigrant a green card. Battered spouses do not appear
lo have superior character trails or skills (at least not any that result from their being
battered), and if the family relationship that produced the visa application has ended,
it is unclear why the government would think that the imrnigrant would provide
stability to the citizen's family life. If anything, a truly merit-based immigration system might worry that admitting victims of domestic violence would undennine the
principles of immigration law; even if it is not the immigrant's fault, being a victim
is not usually a qualification
for a green card or citizenship, just as being poor or
unskilled is not. In the case of domestic violence victims, the nation appears to be
offering a helping hand not because the immigrant brings something special to the
nation, but because the nation placed the immigrant at risk. It is the nation's fault,
in a sense, that it required the victim to be sponsored by her spouse, so if the nation
wants to justify keeping the spousal sponsorship requirement
in most cases, it must
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make exceptions for the cases in which the citizen spouse has not upheld his end of
the bargain.
The VA WA petitioner who ultimately becomes a citizen, then, stands in rnarked
contrast to the family- or employer-sponsored
immigrant. The immediate
relative is
worthy because of a flourishing relationship (even if we might worry that flourishing
marital relationships
can nevertheless be subordinating);
the employee is worthy
because she can do work that is needed in this country, for which American workers
are not available.
But the battered spouse petitioner
gains green card status not
because she is a desirable worker or family member, but because the state has
stepped in to protect her. To become a citizen, a VAWA imrnigrant must first
becorne a victim.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown that citizenship does not occur at the moment of naturalization, but is instead a process, occurring over several years. The law explicitly imposes
this process by specifying the categories of irnrnigrants who may ultimately apply for
naturalization. These immigrants become citizens not primarily through studying
for their naturalization
exams or learning English, although these are important
elements, but through the everyday actions of living their lives. The United States
puts particular stock in the ability of citizens to acculturate their immigrant spouses
through marriage. Encouraging irnmigration
based on marriage, then, is both a
reflection of this reality and a way of reifying it.
The emphasis on farnily-based immigration and the limitation
on access to
employment-based
immigration have a profound influence on the way in which
women become citizens. For many wornen, the process of becoming occurs through
participation
in heterosexual marriage, an institution that shapes identity in ways that
are sornetirnes subordinating for women. As Nancy Cott has shown, the institution of
marriage has been "the vehicle for the state's part in forming and sustaining the gender order," and the law of immigration and citizenship has, throughout history, aided
and abetted this formation and sustenance."
In the case of irnrnigration law, the
law deepens marriage's subordinating potential by putting immigrant spouses at the
mercy of their citizen sponsors, who can refuse to offer sponsorship; even a woman
who does not: experience heterosexual marriage as subordinating has the dynamics of
her marriage altered through the requirement that she seek her husband's approval
to apply for permanent resident status and by the requirement that he demonstrate
his financial ability to support her regardless of her own earning potential. For those
women whose rnarriages fail clue to violence and abuse, the system offers an unfortunate resolution: they may become citizens capable of choosing allegiance to the
5 Nancy F. Cott, "M"rriage and Women's Citizenship
Rev. 1140, 1442 (1998).
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United States, but only by demonstrating that they have experienced
a failure of
autonomy in their personal lives.
In addition to telling us much about what the United States values in assessing
potential citizens, immigration law also tells us something important about how the
United States allows its citizens to exercise their citizenship.
Citizens can sponsor
their spouses, and indeed are given control over the decision of whether an immigrant spouse will live in the United States. For some citizens (who are likely to
be disproportionately
male), this ability may often mean not only access to companionship and friendship, but also access to someone to care for children and to
perform household labor. But for citizens who wish to sponsor an employee, rather
than a relative, to perform care work, immigration law fails to provide a legal means.
Because of the gendered allocation of household labor that persists in the majority of
American families, immigration law's privileging of the family member over the care
worker affects the ability of U.S. citizens to exercise their citizenship by extending
immigration status to others in ways that are also gendered. Men are simply more
likely to be able to depend on a wife to perform care work for free than women are
able to depend on men; most women must go to the open market if they seek assistance in this work, and immigration law does not allow them to do so legally. Just a
few decades ago, immigration patterns commonly involved early migration by men,
followed by family migration of their wives and children. That pattern is now changing: many women are rnigrating, including women with families, alone, commonly
to do care work for other people's farnilies.r" Although there are reasons to be very
concerned about commodification
of care work and exploitation of domestic workers, pushing these practices underground and refusing to recognize the citizenship
potential of women involved in this work does nothing to ameliorate these concerns.
Of course, not all immigrants who obtain legal residency, and ultimately, citizenship, through employment are men, and not all those who obtain it through family
relationships
or victim status are women. For some couples, the system may even
have subversive potential. A system that demands that the U.S. citizen spouse take
on the role of decision maker, sponsor, and breadwinner may not only entrench the
subordination in some marriages, but also may provide the possibility of role reversal
in others. Given the ways in which many marriages retain at least some vestiges of
traditional gender roles, however, it seems likely that much of the effect of the law is
a one-way ratchet. Even an ostensibly gender-neutral
requirement like the spousal
sponsorship requirement, or the exceptions for battered spouses - male and fernale set forth in VAWA, may have, on average, very different influences on men and
women because of their different experiences of marriage as an institution.
Every naturalized citizen has an immigration
story and a citizenship story. This
chapter has tried to show that these stories are related, perhaps even coextensive. The
26
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story of naturalization is not simply a story of jumping through the hoops required by
the naturalization laws; it is also one of establishing a legal identity as an immigrant
by qualifying for a particular type of irnrnigration status, and then living in the
United States for a period of time, most often engaging every day in the activity, be it
marriage or crnployrnent, that justified the status in the first place. Thus, a person's
immigration story informs her citizenship story.
The woman whose immigration story is one of following her husband because of
his job prospects is in a different position vis-a-vis the nation on the eve of her naturalization ceremony than is the immigrant computer programmer who obtained
an employment-based green card, or the refugee who suffered political persecution,
or even the diversity lottery winner who was simply lucky. Her contribution to the
United States is qualitatively different, based not on the value of her skills, a moral
clairn of entitlement because of persecution, or growing up in an underrepresented
country, but instead on her participation as a wife in heterosexual
marriage. In
cases of spouses who obtain legal status because of domestic violence, the contribution is even more attenuated. The archetypical story of the fresh, entrepreneurial
spirit contributed by the immigrant, of the constant reenergizing of the population
through the assimilation of new blood, takes on a different cast in the case of family
immigration, one where the new voices are telling an old story of marital duty and
self-denial in the face of a spouse's life projects. On the eve of their naturalization,
immigrants who achieve legal status as a result of family relationships or victim status
have a relationship with the nation, but it is a relationship that has been mediated
by their spouses. This mediated relationship between individual and nation is one
that develops over time and in a process of becoming, rather than in a moment of
consent between individual and nation. For some women, "becoming a woman," as
defined by Beauvoir, and becoming a citizen are intertwined processes: both occur
through the crucible of marriage, and learning how to be a woman in rnarriage is
part of learning to be a citizen.
There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas outlined in this chapter. Eradicating
immigration law of its privileging of the family would create serious problems, especially for children. Much of the gender difference in immigration law results frorn
the conditions in immigrants' countries of origins and not because of the law itself.
But some of the particularly troubling aspects could at least be tempered. Recognizing care work as skilled labor, for example, would give child care workers a path to
citizenship
because of the skills they possess. Elirninating the spousal sponsorship
requirement would give immigrants the autonomy to decide for themselves whether
their residency and domicile should follow that of their U.S. citizen spouses. Eliminating the affidavit of support, or altering it to reflect total family income instead of
the income of the citizen spouse, would avoid reinscribing a breadwinner-dependent
dynamic in marriages. Recognizing the changing gender dynamics in immigration
law is an important: first step to gaining substantive equality in the acquisition of
citizenship.

